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Paxinos: Green River Ordinances

MONTANA GREEN RIVER ORDINANCES
Dennis Paxinos
I.

INTRODUCTION

Equal protection is the constitutional guarantee that similar
people will be dealt with in a similar manner.' In Tipco Corp., Inc.
v. City of Billings,' the Montana Supreme Court ruled Billings'
"Green River" ordinances unconstitutional under the equal protection clauses of the United States and Montana Constitutions. This
note focuses on the Montana court's standard of review for testing
equal protection violations and the validity of "Green River" laws.
II.

Tipco

CORP., INC. V. CITY OF BILLINGS

A.

Facts

Tipco Corporation, a foreign corporation that maintained no
business office in Montana, licensed and bonded twelve independent sales agents to solicit magazine subscription orders. The
agents canvassed Billings door-to-door. The agents were arrested
and incarcerated under Billings' "Green River" ordinance.4 This
ordinance prohibited solicitors and peddlers from selling goods
door-to-door unless invited by the occupant of the business or residence. The Billings ordinance exempted regularly established businesses, bona fide merchants, or any person selling goods produced
1. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV. 341
(1949).
2. Mont. , 642 P.2d 1074 (1982).
3. In 1931, Green River, Wyoming, enacted an ordinance which provided:
The practice of going in and upon private residences in the Town of Green River,
Wyoming, by solicitors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant merchants and transient vendors of merchandise, not having been requested or invited to do so by the owner
or owners, occupant or occupants of said private residences, for the purpose of
soliciting orders for the sale of goods, wares and merchandise, and/or peddling or
hawking the same is hereby declared to be a nuisance and punishable as such
nuisance or misdemeanor.
Since this ordinance was the first of its kind raised for United States Supreme Court
review, such an ordinance has become known in the legal jargon as a "Green River" ordinance. It will be denominated as such throughout this case note.
4. Billings Municipal Code § 4.20.050 provides:
The practice of going into private residences, business establishments, or offices in
the City by solicitors, peddlers, hawkers, itinerant merchants and transient vendors of merchandise not having been requested or invited to do so by the owner or
owners, occupant or occupants of private residences, business establishments or
offices for the purpose of soliciting orders for the sale of goods, wares, and merchandise and/or for the purpose of disposing of and/or peddling or hawking same
is hereby declared to be a nuisance and punishable as a misdemeanor.
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on premises located within one hundred and fifty miles of the city.
Tipco sought to enjoin the city from enforcing its ordinance and to
have the law declared unconstitutional. The district court treated
the case as if motions for summary judgment had been filed and
granted the City summary judgment. Tipco appealed on a number
of issues. The Montana Supreme Court dismissed all save the
equal protection issue and ruled the ordinance unconstitutional.
B.

The Court's Reasoning

Upon review of Billings' "Green River" ordinance, the court
found no conflict between state statutes licensing itinerant vendors87 and the city ordinance prohibiting certain types of solicitation activities.8 It noted that "powers of local government shall be
liberally construed" and "every reasonable doubt as to the extent
of that power shall be resolved in favor of local government." 9 The
court stated cities may control "uninvited solicitors," declare them
a nuisance, and prohibit their activity under the 1972 Montana
Constitution and statutes enacted since adoption. 10 The court followed Breard v. City of Alexandria" and held Billings' "Green
River" ordinance did not violate Montana's freedom of speech 1 2 or

due process' 5 guarantees," and it did not impact the federal Constitution's commerce clause.15
The Montana Supreme Court addressed the equal protection
attack raised by Tipco and followed the now classic equal protection analysis of the United States Supreme Court-the "two tier
approach."' 16 Under this analysis, statutory classifications based on
race or national origin,17 or those inhibiting the exercise of a "fun5. Billings Municipal Code § 5.20.060 provides:
The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to regularly established places of business or
to bonafide merchants having regularly established places of business within said city, or to
any person distributing by sale, or otherwise, produced by him on owned or leased premises;
provided such premises are located within 150 miles of the City.
6. Tipco, Mont. , 642 P.2d at 1079.
7. MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-21-2301(2) (1981).
8. Tipco, Mont. , 642 P.2d at 1077.
9. Id. (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 7-1-101 (1981)).
10. Id. at , 642 P.2d at 1077-78.

11. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
12.
13.
14.

15.
16.
trine on
(1972).
17.

MONT. CONST. art. II, § 7.
MONT. CONsT. art. II, § 17.
Tipco, Mont. , 642 P.2d at 1078.

Id.
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreward:In Search of Evolving Doca Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAnv. L. REv. 1
See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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damental right '" are constitutionally permissible only if necessary
to achieve a compelling state interest. Classification of this type
will be subject to "strict scrutiny." 19 This test means that a court
will not defer to the decision of the governing body but instead will
independently determine the relationships between the legislation's means and its ends.2" In Tipco, the court determined the
Billings ordinance was not subject to a "strict scrutiny" test of
equal protection "because it does not burden a fundamental right
nor constitute indivious discrimination against a suspect class.""
The court then applied the "rational relationship" test-the second tier. Classifications which fall under this analysis are upheld so
long as they arguably relate to a legitimate function of government.2 2 In Tipco, the Montana Supreme Court held the Billings
ordinance failed the rational relationship test and was unconstitutional. The court reasoned that "the only rational relationship that
has been suggested is that the city can exercise control over local
merchants. ' 23 The court found the city's argument difficult to follow and not rationally related to the achievement of a legitimate
governmental objective.2
The United States Supreme Court has used a far less critical
approach in evaluating legislative classifications under the "rational relationship" test. The Court has taken two approaches to
such classifications. First, legislation that resulted in the unequal
treatment of individuals but did not create a classification simply
has not been perceived as falling within the scope of the equal protection clause.2 5 Second, any non-suspect classification has passed
constitutional muster so long as it rested "on grounds [not] wholly
irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective." 6 The rational relationship test demands that the Justices recite some plausible set of facts that would allow the Court to justify the statute
27
in question.
The rational relationship or "minimal scrutiny" standard re18.
19.

See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
Id.

20. L.

TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §

16-10 (1978).

21. Tipco, Mont. -,
642 at 1078.
22. Gunther, supra note 16.
23. Tipco, Mont. -,
642 P.2d at 1078 (emphasis added).
24. Id.
25. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973). "The function of the Equal Protection Clause ... is simply to measure the validity of classifications
created by state laws." Id. at 59 (Stewart, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
26. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425 (1961).
27. See Forum: Equal Protection and the Burger Court, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 645,
647 (1975).
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flects the Supreme Court's reluctance to interfere with legislative
decisions. The Supreme Court has even conjured factual bases to
render legislative classifications "rational" in deference to the legislature.2 The Court has demonstrated avowed hesitation to substitute judicial value judgment for those elected to legislate.2 9
The Montana Supreme Court chose not to "conjure" or "recite" some plausible reasoning to justify Billings' "Green River"
ordinance. Instead, the court rejected the City's "rational reasons"
and found the classification patently arbitrary. The court grounded
its analysis on the fact that the Billings ordinance exempted "locals" from the solicitation prohibitions while in Breard there was
no exemption for local merchants.3 0 The Montana court then
struck down both the exemption and the ordinance "since we have
no way of knowing whether the City of Billings would enact the
ordinance without the unconstitutional exemption." 3'
III.

ANALYSIS

The Tipco decision is troubling for three reasons. First, the
Montana Supreme court misread the Breard decision. Second, the
Montana court appears to have adopted a new and questionable
standard of review for equal protection attacks. Third, because of
this decision, Montana's municipalities must review and revise
their respective "Green River" ordinances to comply with the
court's interpretation of Montana's equal protection clause.
The Montana court cited Breard as the determinative case for
"Green River" ordinances such as Billings'. The court parenthetically noted that the ordinance in Breard did not exempt local
merchants.3 2 This reading by the court is fundamentally wrong.
The ordinance in Breard exempted "local purveyors of farm products" from the ordinance.33 The Billings ordinance exempts "any
person distributing by sale or otherwise goods produced by him on
owned or leased premises . . . located within 150 miles of the
city."" The Montana Supreme Court found such an exemption patently arbitrary under the rational relationship test. The Montana
court did not defer to the city's legislation and rejected the city's
argument for the exemption. This is a misapplication of the ra28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

See, e.g., McGowan, 366 U.S. at 425-26.
See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399 (1937).
Tipco, Mont. -- ,642 P.2d at 1078.
Id. at -,
642 P.2d at 1079.
Id. at -,
642 P.2d at 1078.
Breard, 341 U.S. at 647.
Tipco, Mont. -. , 642 P.2d at 1076.
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tional basis test. Once a court determines that no fundamental
right is burdened, it may speculate for rationale to justify the
legislation."
In People v. Bohnke,3 6 the town of Southampton, New York,
had an ordinance similar to Billings', including an exemption for
any person maintaining a business in Southampton for six months.
The Court of Appeals of New York held that the exemption did
not violate equal protection guarantees. The town's stated purpose
for the ordinance was "to protect its citizens against crime.

37

The

court considered that reason for the ordinance and held the exemption valid as well because "presumably the dangers and annoyances of... unsolicited visits are less when the.., uninvited visitors are not strangers but known, or easily identifiable and
traceable, residents of the community." 8 The Bohnke decision is
an example of a court deferring to the legislative body and "conjuring" up plausible facts which allow the court to justify the
ordinance.
In Tipco, the court could have deferred to the Billings city
council and inferred its own set of plausible facts. Billings has a
rational basis for the exemption. First, like all Montana municipalities, it is located near farms and ranches. The "local" producers
who bring fresh food to the city may sometimes sell their goods
going from one business to another, or even on a door-to-door basis. Food produced from these area markets benefits the city economically and "presumably" benefits the health of the city's citizens. Therefore, the exemption has a "plausible" rational basis for
its existence and should be immune from an equal protection attack based on the rational relationship test. The Tipco court, however, seemed more concerned with the city's ability to control local
merchants. The Bohnke court reasoned where local merchants are
known or at least easily identifiable, the dangers of annoyance are
less. 9 This was the same rationale offered by the city in Tipco.'0
Since all Montana communities are small enough to identify and
trace their own residents, this rationale should have sufficed the
"rational basis" test employed by the court.
In Tipco, the court implied "Green River" ordinances may be
valid provided they do not exempt "locals."" 1 This decision im35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Gunther, supra note 16.
287 N.Y. 154, 38 N.E.2d
Id. at 158, 38 N.E.2d at
Id.
Id.
Tipco, Mont. -,
Id. at -,
642 P.2d at

478 (1941).
479.

642 P.2d at 1078.
1079.
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pacts some local merchants as demonstrated by Phillips v. City of
Bend," a case decided only weeks after Breard. In this case, a local
citizen and businessman was arrested under that city's "Green
River" ordinance for selling vacuum cleaners door-to-door. This ordinance did not expressly exempt local merchants. The local businessman vehemently argued that the ordinance discriminated
against him since he was unable to demonstrate his product in a
customer's home. He contended this ordinance violated his equal
protection rights under both the United States and Oregon Constitutions.4' The citizen argued the ordinance implied that local
merchants were allowed to sell their wares in the prohibited man44
ner since local businessmen were not itinerant merchants.
The Oregon Supreme Court chose not to construe the ordinance to imply such an exemption. Instead, the court held the ordinance merely condemned the method of the sale and did not rely
on the merchant's location. It stated that "the municipal ordinance
which places them in a single class for the purpose of regulation is
not manifestly arbitrary or without reasonable basis and the legislative intent will therefore not be disturbed." 5 The court held that
since no exemption for local merchants was expressed, none could
be implied." Now, under Tipco, Montana communities which have
a "Green River" ordinance may not expressly exempt their local
merchants or their local purveyors of farm products from soliciting
in the community. Thus, communities wishing to permit their local
producers to sell must permit all solicitors to sell within their city.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Montana court's Tipco decision signals a departure from
the simple two-tier approach analysis of the constitutionality of a
statute under the equal protection clause. Generally, when a court
applies a "strict scrutiny" standard, it is fatal to the statute, and
when a court applies "minimal scrutiny" a statute is upheld. 7 The
Montana court has failed to articulate a meaningful rationale explaining why it chose a "heightened" judicial scrutiny standard
while invoking the language of "rational basis."
The Tipco case may result in an accumulation of ad hoc decisions flexible enough to accommodate the court's preference for re42.
43.

192 Or. 143, 234 P.2d 572 (1951).
Id. at 148, 234 P.2d at 576.

44.

Id.

45.
46.
47.

Id. at 160, 234 P.2d at 579.
Id.
Gunther, supra note 16, at 8.
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sults in the realm of equal protection. Tipco may stand for a
stricter basis test than has previously been applied. As for "Green
River" laws in Montana, no exemptions may be granted unless all
persons, including foreign corporations, are permitted the privilege
of selling door-to-door.
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